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The interim government in 
Prague 2009
A constant claim in politics is for sustainability. The 
Czech Republic has satisfied this demand, since it has 
sustainably disgraced itself  at European level. Nicholas 
Sarkozy and other core-Europeans of  the nice, old 
Europe will laugh up their sleeves and point to their 
warning words at the end of  the “Grande Présidence.” 
On March 24, the social democratic opposition (ČSSD) 
overthrew the coalition government led by the conser-
vative Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek (ODS). He was 
forced to resign and from then on had only managerial 
responsibilities. The search for an interim government 
began and the Czech Republic fell head over heels into 
an actual cabinet crisis, which also had an impact on 
Europe: The domestic disempowerment of  the Czech 
government has brought an interim presidency that is 
politically inexperienced and publicly unknown to the 
EU.
The European Union appears to be without guidance. 
The last EU summit in Prague on the Eastern Partner-
ship turned out to be a meeting composed of  sub-
stitutes, which is an indication of  the perception and 
order of  priorities in other European capitals. Thereby, 
the political matters of  EU high-level meetings are 
reduced in rank and the efforts of  the Czech govern-
ment regarding agenda and outcome are foiled.
The Czech Republic at Europe’s Forefront
Yet, everything at the beginning looked different. After 
the Czech Republic assumed the EU presidency on 
January 1, 2009, the government in Prague seemed to 
be well-prepared for the “challenge of  the EU presi-
dency” against all prophecies of  doom, and obtained 
acceptance, to the disapproval of  president Václav 
Klaus, an avowed critic of  the EU, who fiercely at-
tacked the Treaty of  Lisbon. However, the Czech 
parliament ratified the treaty in February, and only the 
ratification in the second chamber, the Senate, was 
missing.
The EU crisis management in Prague was challenged 
from the very beginning. The war in the Gaza Strip led 
to a discussion on the extent of  European engagement 
in the Middle East, and the dispute between Russia and 
the Ukraine over gas clearly demonstrated the conse-
quences of  the EU’s dependence on energy. Czech po-
liticians and civil servants commuted between Moscow 
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In the Czech Republic, the coalition government formed by Conservatives, Christian Democrats and Greens was 
overthrown by a no-confidence vote at the end of  March 2009. Since May 8, a “cabinet of  government officials” 
has assumed the official functions until early elections in mid-October—and this during the Czech EU Presidency. 
The approach of  the opposition shows political irresponsibility and provincial narrow-mindedness. Even the former 
president and moral mentor of  the Czech Republic, Václav Havel, condemned the opposition for its stupidity and 
accused it of  stabbing the government in the back.
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and Kiev, fought against Sarkozy’s action-taking and 
represented a whole region with their achievements: 
Even small, new democracies are able to successfully 
lead the European Union.
The Overthrow of the Government
The happiness only lasted until March 24. Although 
the party leader of  the social democratic opposition 
(ČSSD), Jiří Paroubek, had announced a truce with the 
coalition government for the time of  the EU presiden-
cy and had hitherto presented himself  pro-European, 
he launched a no-confidence vote against the govern-
ment—and won.
Paroubek was able to do so with the help of  two dis-
senters of  Topolánek’s ODS and two delegates of  the 
small Green coalition party. In fact, it should have been 
an easy task: Topolánek’s government had only 98 
of  the 200 seats in Parliament and had to rely on the 
goodwill of  its independent deputies. The Prime Min-
ister constantly stood in Paroubek’s line of  fire. Par-
oubek had already tried to overthrow the government 
four times. Evidently, the opposition leader himself  
did not believe he would succeed in his fifth attempt, 
since he lacked a political concept for a further course 
of  action. Instead, he argued in favor of  a continuation 
of  the official functions by the previous government 
which should prepare early elections right after the EU 
presidency.
But this was reckoned without the President. Václav 
Klaus saw the chance to finally take down his party 
archfiend Topolánek and to dismantle the Treaty of  
Lisbon, which represented the symbol of  all evil in 
Europe to him.
Topolánek had moved the ODS more and more away 
from its founding father and honorary chairman, Klaus, 
especially with regard to European issues. The latter 
resigned office at the end of  2008 after his favorite, 
Pavel Bém, had lost the election for party chair against 
Topolánek.
The “successful” no-confidence vote provided Klaus 
with great influence, as he could decide who should 
continue governing—and this during the Czech EU 
presidency and just shortly before the vote on the 
Treaty of  Lisbon in the Czech Senate.
Václav Klaus denied Topolánek the mandate to form a 
government. Thus, the two big parties were forced to 
agree upon a—preferably apolitical—candidate, who 
would then be suggested to the President as interim 
premier in order to form a cabinet of  state officials. 
Jan Fischer, the head of  the Czech statistic agency, 
was chosen. He is unknown and inexperienced in the 
Czech political arena, and even less qualified in the 
European political scene.
But Klaus was enormously mistaken regarding to the 
second aspect: The Czech Senate did vote for the 
Treaty of  Lisbon on May 6, and in this respect, also 
voted against the President.
Fierce Criticism and Disappointed Citizens
The behavior of  the opposition shows that even five 
years after joining the EU, domestic power intrigues 
and irresponsibility concerning European issues con-
tinue to dominate the political arena in Prague. The 
criticism was accordingly fierce both at home and 
abroad. Petr Drulák, the director of  the well-respected 
Institute for International Relations in Prague, called 
for the replacement of  the ruling political class and 
appealed for an electoral boycott in the conservative 
newspaper Lidové noviny. The response was also broadly 
negative in Germany. Klaus Brill, correspondent of  the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, spoke of  a “deficit of  statesmanlike 
sense of  responsibility” and about the pronounced 
reluctance to find a democratic compromise amongst 
the political elite.
With regards to European politics, the successful no-
confidence vote has to be regarded as a disaster. Topo-
lánek himself  called it an international disgrace. The 
ministers were forced to leave office in the middle of  
the presidency, and expertise and experience concern-
ing the European political arena disappeared overnight. 
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The Minister for European Affairs, Alexandr Von-
dra, who was responsible for the conception of  the 
presidency, had to hand over his duties to the former 
ambassador to NATO.
Meanwhile, many Czechs view the ado on Prague Cas-
tle and in the Parliament with a mixture of  disinterest 
and dismay. Ninety percent of  the Czech population 
is discontent with the current political situation. They 
followed the EU presidency with growing interest and 
were subsequently disappointed by their political elite. 
They will give a corresponding reply: The turnout of  
voters during the upcoming European elections will be 
low, and both big parties will lose support in the early 
elections in mid-October.
Re-alignment of the Political Balance of Power in 
Prague
This development provides an opportunity for the 
Czechs to adjust their domestic balance of  power. The 
government led by Mirek Topolánek stood on a shaky 
ground right from the beginning and only possessed 
the majority in parliament with the support of  dissent-
ers from the social democratic opposition. Thus, the 
government was only capable of  acting and making 
decisions in a limited way. Early elections should have 
already broken up this stalemate earlier on.
Political instability, unfortunately, has a tradition in 
Prague. Since the breakup of  Czechoslovakia in 1993, 
the Czech Republic was governed for six years by 
ČSSD or ODS minority governments as no stable 
coalition governments could be formed. The country 
has had ten governments within its nearly 17 years of  
independence.
The EU presidency has eclipsed this situation. It 
seemed to be a multi-partisan consensus in order to 
not disgrace itself  in Brussels and keep up appearances 
for half  a year. This attempt failed, but the Czech poli-
ticians can now gather themselves.
With the “cabinet of  government officials” headed 
by Fischer, the ODS and ČSSD have basically agreed 
upon a Grand Coalition. This was only possible be-
cause none of  the outstanding protagonists of  either 
party heads the government. The seemingly neutral 
government now provides some leeway for both 
camps since it is suggested that none of  the parties 
actually bears the responsibility for political decisions. 
But without the support and the votes from parliament, 
there would be no “cabinet of  state officials” as it 
requires parliamentary majorities and has nothing to do 
with the presidential system of  the Weimar Republic 
that could bypass the parliament by presidential man-
dates. The Social Democrats have given Fischer a list 
of  demands that must be met. Otherwise, they will not 
pass the vote of  confidence in parliament which is due 
until June 6. Thus, the game continues.
A Functioning Government is Needed
The personal power struggle between Topolánek and 
Paroubek must not determine politics after the elec-
tions in October. The antagonized protagonists need 
to come to the conclusion that they must resign from 
the political scene. Whether they are willing to do so 
remains dubious, but parties are always built from the 
bottom up regarding political content and personnel.
Therefore, moderate powers within the ODS and 
ČSSD should try to strengthen their influence and aim 
to form a Grand Coalition after the early elections. 
Such an alliance indeed is not the perfect solution, as 
the German example shows. In light of  possible alter-
natives after the election in mid-October, however, this 
construction might be the best compromise to form 
a stable and functioning government, independent of  
party dissenters or the archaic Communist Party. Pre-
sumably, neither ČSSD nor ODS will be able to find a 
majority together with the smaller parties.
The Czech Republic needs a stable government in 
order to meet the challenges of  the economic crisis 
that will have strongly affected Prague until October 
and to restrict the influence of  the President. As it 
stands now, the President will not allow the European 
flag to be flown over Prague Castle until 2013. Under 
constitutional law, the possibilities of  the President 
are limited, yet forceful actors are needed in order to 
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counter his political ego and his obsession with re-
cognition. The Czech Parliament and Senate, through 
the ratification of  the Treaty of  Lisbon, have shown 
that although Klaus may grumble, he has no decisive 
political influence. He may act as the keeper of  the 
independent Czech democracy against the totalitarian 
threat coming from Brussels, but he seems to have 
problems accepting basic democratic principles. After 
the ratification of  the Lisbon treaty in the Senate, he 
accused the Senators of  having “cowardly failed” and 
announced to postpone his constitutional signature as 
long as possible. Apparently he overplayed the situa-
tion, as even former supporters distanced themselves 
from him. Voices coming from the Czech Senate to 
dispose Klaus from office demonstrate how severe the 
irritation actually is.
A stable government after the election in October 
would strengthen the Czech capacity concerning for-
eign affairs, lack of  which will unfortunately remain a 
bitter aftertaste of  the Czech EU presidency. The par-
liamentary groups of  the European Parliament and the 
European affiliates should support the Czech parties 
concerning the establishment of  a political culture that 
considers the parliamentary compromise as a success 
and not as defeat. It was a positive sign that the Ger-
man Chancellor traveled to Prague in May even though 
other heads of  government were absent from the EU 
summit on the Eastern Partnership. 
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